

NDA Plutonium Options – A Consultation by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority

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Recommendations

Member's views are sought on the NDA consultation.

It is recommended that comments are received before the 30th September in order to provide a draft response; to be tabled at the October NWG.

INTRODUCTION

As a result of historic reprocessing operations since the 1950s, the UK has built up a significant stockpile of separated civil plutonium in the form of plutonium oxide and residues, which is estimated to grow to around 100te at the completion of reprocessing. The most appropriate future management strategy of the civil plutonium stock is an important issue to be determined by Government with assistance from NDA.

This consultation document is part of the NDA's process of stakeholder engagement to develop its '**plutonium disposition strategy**'. The overall objective of the plutonium disposition strategy is to work up a series of future management options for the UK's civil stocks of plutonium, so that policy options can be presented to Government by the end of December 2008 for their consideration.

The consultation closes on the end of October 2008.

KEY POINTS

The **key drivers and issues** currently being considered during the development of the Plutonium Disposition Strategy are:

- Continued long-term storage of civil plutonium is not an easy or inexpensive option, and has many technical challenges.
- All plutonium management options under consideration are expensive and need national level consideration.

- Different solutions have different environmental impacts and carbon footprints.
- Separated plutonium has the potential to pose a significant worker safety risk.
- Separated plutonium may be considered to be a “proliferation” or security risk, especially if very long-term storage as plutonium oxide powder is anticipated.
- The plutonium stockpile potentially has a very large energy value to the UK which may prove to be a national asset.
- The socio-economic impacts of the solutions vary both in terms of time and total impact.

At a high level there are three **credible options**, these are;

1. Store indefinitely
2. Immobilise and dispose
3. Reuse and dispose

It is important to note that; the ‘**store option**’ shown above is not a sustainable solution to plutonium management and would need to change at some point in the future to either dispose or reuse. Indeed, CoRWM recommended that if any material had not been used within 300 years, then it should be regarded as waste.

Attachments

Appendix 1 – ‘NDA Plutonium Options’ for comment August ‘08 – October ‘08

NDA Plutonium Options

For comment: August 2008 - October 2008

A.1 Introduction

The NDA's core objective is to ensure that the civil public sector nuclear sites under its ownership are decommissioned and cleaned up safely, securely, cost effectively and in ways that protect the environment for this and future generations. This means a mission to take all the radioactive wastes, fuel and materials, and to perform all the treatment and activities required to avoid the need for any significant future institutional care.

The NDA is leading the development of a unified and coherent strategy, working in partnership with regulators and site licensees, whilst striving to achieve:

- High safety and environmental standards
- Value for money
- Socio-economic benefit for local communities

As a result of historic reprocessing operations since the 1950s, the UK has built up a significant stockpile of separated civil plutonium in the form of plutonium oxide and residues, which is estimated to grow to around 100te at the completion of reprocessing. The most appropriate future management strategy of the civil plutonium stock is an important issue to be determined by Government with assistance from NDA.

A.1.1 What is Plutonium?

Plutonium is element number 94 in the periodic table and has the chemical symbol Pu. It is a metal and belongs to the Actinide series of elements. The half-lives of the different isotopes differ markedly, ranging from 14 years to around 375,000 years, and this affects the characteristics of plutonium which is derived from different reactors. Plutonium occurs in nature in minute quantities and is produced in reactors through neutron capture by uranium.

One of the most important characteristics is the rate at which the plutonium isotope with the shortest half life decays to form Am-241, which is more radioactive than plutonium. The in-growth of americium makes the plutonium which is currently stored more difficult to handle. The americium will last about 300 years before it starts to decay away.

More detail about the isotopes of plutonium, the way in which plutonium decays and the varying plutonium compositions of different fuel types can be found in Appendix 1.

A.1.2 Formation and Management of the UK Plutonium Stockpile

In the 1950s the separation of plutonium was carried out primarily for defence purposes. During the 1960s the Developed Nations realised that fossil fuels would eventually run out and that a new energy "answer" was required. This answer was considered by many (including the UK) to be nuclear power, initially via conventional thermal reactors and subsequently via fast reactors.

Fast reactors are started up using plutonium-based reactor cores as well as using uranium as a surrounding fuel for breeding more plutonium. They use over 99% of the uranium resource for energy production, whereas conventional nuclear reactors use less than 1% of the uranium resource. Since the 1960s, fast reactor technology has been actively pursued and has always been "about 20-30 years away". As the UK would require a significant stockpile of plutonium to fuel any future fast reactor programme, it was agreed that any surplus plutonium would be classed as civil and stored for future use. However, in the 1970s and 80s, fast reactor research did not progress as rapidly as expected and storage of plutonium gave rise to increasing

proliferation concerns. One consequence was that in 1976 the Carter administration in the USA stopped civil production of plutonium by cancelling their civil reprocessing operations, thereby avoiding an increase of their civil plutonium stockpile. In the UK, fast reactor research was supported until 1994 when it was stopped. However, there was no accompanying policy development for plutonium management and the policy in the UK became continued storage.

The separated plutonium is currently safely and securely stored at Sellafield, with small quantities at Dounreay, and the stock is added to as a result of on-going spent fuel reprocessing. Hence the current stockpile is expected to increase until reprocessing operations stop in the UK. However, as the policy has been to continue to store the plutonium, management plans for either reuse or disposal of the plutonium have not been developed.

Continued long-term storage of civil plutonium is not an easy or inexpensive option, and has many technical challenges, not least because of the in-growth of americium over time (see Appendix 1). However, plutonium fuel (reuse) and plutonium immobilisation (waste) plants are expensive and very technically challenging. Any new plant is likely to take one or two decades to begin to process material, and so there is no quick or inexpensive solution.

A.1.3 NDA's Role and Responsibilities

The NDA is required to provide a lifecycle cost estimate for dealing with the UK's nuclear legacy. This legacy includes separated civil plutonium and the current baseline (see section A.2 below) does not provide a lifetime solution for plutonium management. The NDA has estimated the costs of disposing of the plutonium but have not added this to the national liabilities estimated since the material, as a matter of policy, is currently regarded as a zero value asset. In order to establish a well underpinned estimate, the NDA commissioned a uranium and plutonium macro-economic study in 2006.

The NDA is currently finalising the analysis of this wide ranging, two-year nuclear materials optioneering study, covering the environmental, socio-economic and financial impacts. In order to evaluate the various potential management options for these materials, assumptions have been made over key technical, cost and timescale parameters and these have been input to a parametric model that was specifically developed for the study.

The final output is a comprehensive economic analysis of future nuclear material disposition scenarios. 'Disposition' includes direct disposal and/or use options. It should be noted that ultimately all options conclude with final disposal. The comprehensive economic analysis is based around:

- a life cycle approach (i.e. all options are followed through to final use/disposal);
- financial, socio-economic, safety and environmental analysis.

The study allows a full economic and financial estimation of the full value of the public sector asset or liability enabling NDA to engage with Government on the appropriate approach to adopt and informing policy on future disposition of these materials.

The key drivers and issues currently being considered during the development of the Plutonium Disposition Strategy are:

- Continued long-term storage of civil plutonium is not an easy or inexpensive option, and has many technical challenges.

- All plutonium management options under consideration are expensive and need national level consideration.
- Different solutions have different environmental impacts and carbon footprints.
- Separated plutonium has the potential to pose a significant worker safety risk.
- Separated plutonium may be considered to be a “proliferation” or security risk, especially if very long-term storage as plutonium oxide powder is anticipated .
- The plutonium stockpile potentially has a very large energy value to the UK which may prove to be a national asset.
- The socio-economic impacts of the solutions vary both in terms of time and total impact.

The factors we are planning to include in our consideration are described above and can broadly be categorised to be economic, socio-economic and safety (including security) or environmental. Are there any other significant drivers you think we should be considering in the final analysis?

A.2 Current Baseline

Uranium and Plutonium (U and Pu) held in the UK’s civil stockpile are currently treated as zero value assets. Whether they are assets or liabilities, and the magnitude of these values, have major implications on how the materials should be managed and accounted for.

The current management plans for plutonium allow for continued safe and secure storage at Dounreay and Sellafield. The existing storage facilities for this material are adequate, but are ageing and at Sellafield, for example, a new storage facility built to modern standards is being completed to enhance the existing arrangements. The cost of this store is several hundred million pounds. It is anticipated that plutonium from the older stores will be transferred to the modern store in a phased manner over the next decade or more, as required.

The new modern store has not been designed to hold the full plutonium inventory and it is likely that new store modules will need to be added in 30-40 years at a similar cost, to allow for the continued safe and secure storage of the plutonium contained in current stores as they reach their end of life. The new store has a design life of between 50 and 100 years, but clearly the new store at Sellafield would eventually need to be replaced, if the policy of continued plutonium storage remains. Similar arrangements may be required for material at Dounreay.

In the NDA Lifetime Plans, the plutonium and plutonium stores cease to be accounted for after 2120. As they have no other management arrangements in place, in accounting terms the plutonium and plutonium stores “disappear”.

This is recognised as a key gap in the national baseline which can only be filled through the development of new policy and strategy.

A.3 Objectives and Scope

The overarching objective of the NDA’s plutonium disposition strategy is to work up a series of future management options for the UK’s civil stocks of separated plutonium, with their lifecycle impacts understood, so that policy options can be presented to Government. The NDA has made commitments over the last two years that it will present a list of plutonium management policy options to Government by the end of December 2008 for their consideration. Any decisions made

by Government on plutonium management policy will be used in the development of other spent fuel and nuclear material strategic areas within UK Nuclear Decommissioning.

The future management of plutonium stocks will have far-reaching consequences for the UK, not just economically, socio-economically and environmentally, but also with potential international strategic implications.

Future policy direction in this area will have a significant impact on other NDA operations, such as spent fuel management options. Additionally, many of the key assumptions made for plutonium management will be pertinent for spent fuel management and a degree of consistency is required

The strategy needs to address all types of plutonium that will ultimately be held in the UK civil stockpile. The three general classes of plutonium are Magnox derived plutonium (~83te), Thorp derived plutonium (~15te) and residues which contain around 3te of plutonium, amounting to around 101 tonnes in total. It should be noted that each of the "isotopic" grades of plutonium, as detailed in Appendix 1, will have sub-groups of material batches with different degrees of chemical purity and characterisation. In the worst case, some of these materials may not be economically reusable due to poor chemical purity.

Although outside the scope of this study, it should also be noted that, by the completion of planned reprocessing, around 34 tonnes of foreign-owned plutonium will have been separated in the UK on behalf of non-UK customers. The bulk of this is derived from reprocessing of Light Water Reactor fuel.

A.3.1 Magnox Derived Plutonium

Magnox derived plutonium makes up the bulk of the UK-owned civil plutonium stockpile. It has comparatively good isotopic quality (i.e. less Pu-241) and could therefore be desirable as a feedstock for making MOx fuel. However some of this grade of plutonium has been stored for several decades already and has a degree of americium in-growth. Whilst technically capable, the Sellafield MOx plant is not currently licensed to process Magnox derived plutonium and some hardware/software (e.g. neutron counters), changes might be necessary to enable this to occur. Magnox derived plutonium has the capability to be exported as there are transport container licences for suitably packaged Magnox plutonium cans.

Depending on the management option selected, it is conceivable that Magnox derived plutonium may need to have its own individual management strategy. In all options it has the advantage that it will contain less Am-241 than Thorp derived plutonium, and, subject to a suitable plant being designed, could be used as a blend stock to enable easier processing of Thorp derived plutonium.

A.3.2 Thorp Derived Plutonium

Thorp derived plutonium makes up a smaller percentage of the UK-owned civil plutonium stockpile and most of it is produced as a consequence of reprocessing spent British Energy fuel, and is hence owned by BE. It currently has a reasonable isotopic quality as the bulk of the material has not been stored for more than 15 years, and therefore has potential as a feedstock for making MOx fuel. However, if this material is stored for much longer periods, its potential suitability for MOx fuel manufacture becomes much less attractive without pre-treatment (chemical polishing), due to the levels of Am-241 grown in. The Sellafield MOx plant is designed to take this grade of plutonium, but its operations are currently 'justified' only for the foreign-owned material. The plant would have to be rejustified for this material if it were to be processed through this route. Thorp

derived plutonium does not currently have the capability to be exported as there are no transport container licenses for Thorp plutonium cans.

The future use of this material, if untreated, is likely to require blending with Magnox derived plutonium to make processing less difficult and therefore less costly.

A.3.3 Foreign-Owned Plutonium

The owners of the foreign-owned plutonium have declared that they would like it returned to the country of origin in the form of MOx fuel. This was the primary reason for the building of the Sellafield MOx plant (SMP). However, for as long as the foreign-owned plutonium is stored in the UK, there is an imperative on the NDA and its contractors that it is stored in a safe and secure manner.


Part of the foreign-owned plutonium is contracted i.e. subject to historic or existing MOx fuel manufacturing contracts. However, the throughput of SMP has fallen well short of expectations and the capability of the plant to return this amount of plutonium to customers (MOx fuel typically contains 5-10% plutonium) cannot be guaranteed. If foreign-owned plutonium could not be returned in the form of fuel produced using SMP, then other management options would need to be developed.

A.4 Credible Options

At a high level, there are three bounding options:

- Store indefinitely
- Immobilise and dispose.
- Reuse and dispose

However, the store option is not a lifecycle solution to plutonium management and would need to change at some point in the future to either dispose or reuse. CoRWM recommended that if any material had not been used within 300 years, then it should be regarded as waste. Diagrammatically the high level credible options can be shown as:



In the diagram "sell" is used to refer to any option which allows the energy value of the plutonium to be exploited and economic value released. If reuse is pursued as an option, the spent fuel would be disposed of directly. Although plutonium is destroyed in this process, the resulting waste would be physically hotter and have a higher radioactivity than the current separated plutonium from which it was derived.

It should also be noted that disposal of any material is contingent on producing a post-closure safety case which will need to satisfy the requirements of the regulators. Likewise, any package proposed for a future geological repository will need to meet the disposal authorisation criteria which exist at the time.

In practice, the likely final strategy for the management of the entire stock of UK civil plutonium may be a combination of all three options.

A4.1 Store

Storage of plutonium is achieved using well engineered, heavy duty sealed steel cans which are kept in purpose-built stores. The current arrangements and behaviour of plutonium in storage are well known and safety cases are developed which have large margins of safety. Indeed, all the options discussed within this paper rely to a greater or lesser extent on the use of interim storage while plants are designed and constructed and the plutonium processed. If a decision were taken today on a solution for the inventory, there could still be a requirement to provide storage for around 40 years.

Very long term storage is less well understood and if a policy of indefinite storage were to continue then the NDA is likely to have to expend money in two main areas:

A4.1.1 Stores

Many of the existing stores are ageing and reaching the end of their design life. As knowledge has increased over the past decades, more optimum methods for storing for the longer term have been developed. A new store is currently in the process of being built at Sellafield and is costing several hundred million pounds. The store does not have the capacity to take all the plutonium and so if we plan to store for the long term (post 2036) then additional capacity will need to be added to the new store. This is a cost that could be potentially avoided. Similar issues exist at Dounreay, but on a smaller scale.

A4.1.2 Degradation in Storage

The plutonium continues to undergo radiolytic and chemical reactions whilst in storage. This can lead to the build up of pressure in the cans and in the past has led to contamination of the product with impurities caused by the radiolytic breakdown of packaging materials. These issues are managed to ensure continued safety.

The very long term storage of plutonium is not well understood as the longest any of it has been stored is around 65 years and the THORP derived material only for around 15 years. There is an R&D programme running to predict the long term behaviour of plutonium. The research is at a very early stage, but it is starting to indicate that there may be a requirement to treat or repackage some of the material if it were to be stored for significant periods.

Heat treatment and repackaging plants are likely to cost significantly more than a new store. It should be stressed that all operations with plutonium are dose-intensive for operators, and best practice would be to minimise operation time for plutonium works. Recanning, can modification and can movement are also dose-intensive work unless very expensive remote equipment is back-fitted into facilities.

A4.2 Immobilise and Dispose

Disposal is defined as 'the emplacement of waste in a specialised land disposal facility without intent to retrieve it at a later time - retrieval may be possible but, if intended, the appropriate term for this is storage. The time of emplacement is regarded as the time of disposal, even if the facility is eventually closed many years later'. This paper addresses the specific inventory of separated plutonium, but it should be noted that it is already planned to dispose of wastes bearing small quantities of plutonium, either as plutonium contaminated waste (mixed with other radioactive elements in waste forms e.g. remotely handable ILW) or bound up within spent fuel.

Some of the main issues which need to be addressed to produce a waste form suitable for eventual disposal are:

Processing and storage:

- Ease of processing
- Waste form chemical flexibility to accommodate impurities

Storage/Disposal:

- Product performance
- "Proliferation resistance"

- Volume taken up in the repository
- Repository safety case impact

We are considering the factors above, addressing the behaviour of packages in the repository and the process to treat the waste to produce a form suitable for disposal. Are there any other significant factors that you think should be taken into consideration?

It is essential that the design of a future geological repository is factored into any final decision on suitable waste form development, and that likely waste forms are also factored into the repository design. As the waste form is likely to be emplaced in a repository in perpetuity, then product durability and long term stability, along with the geological environment, are important factors for consideration. The waste form itself has the potential to make a significant contribution to containment within a disposal facility.

Additionally, some products have the capability of incorporating relatively large quantities of plutonium within the waste form matrix. This can be an advantage in reducing the volume of waste to be produced, while it can be a disadvantage due to criticality concerns within the repository. A key factor in determining the acceptable plutonium incorporation rates will be the package and repository criticality safety cases, although it may be possible to explore higher fissile inventories if neutron poisoning were to be introduced.

Ease of processing is a key attribute as a complex process is likely to be more expensive, less reliable and potentially dose-intensive for operators. The primary technology can only be made to work reliably if all the secondary operations such as powder handling, waste form handling, package cleaning and quality assurance are also straightforward and reliable. Technologies that require complex preparation or product handling will be less attractive.

It is also essential to remember that waste form packages will need to be stored prior to eventual disposal. This can incur a significant cost and decommissioning impact if the number of packages produced by the process is large and they are required to be kept in a store of the highest security categorisation (Category 1 store).

Proliferation resistance is difficult to measure, but estimates have been made for the potential waste forms under consideration. Different waste forms have different levels of proliferation resistance associated with them. For each option, consideration could be given to adding very high level waste. This would increase the degree of proliferation resistance but significantly increase the complexity of the plants required. In order to assess this option, the addition of very high level liquid waste back as part of a vitrification process has been considered. Proliferation resistance has tended to be thought about in terms of the way in which uranium and plutonium are bound up chemically in the waste form. Consideration could also be given to creating proliferation resistance through physical form (too big to remove) or through co-emplacement of highly radioactive wastes with lower activity wastes.

The analysis of all these factors is not yet complete, but the table below gives an indication of some of the relative discriminating factors for the different waste forms and represents our current perceptions.

Type	Waste Form	Durability of waste form	Technical Maturity	Lead time	Proliferation Resistance	Volume of waste	Environmental Impact	Waste form Cost	Disposal Cost	Additional Benefit
Low specification MOx	Ceramic	M	H	Depends on plant suitability (1-20 years)	M/H	L	L	M	M-L	
Cement	Specialist Cement Form	L	H	Circa 2-3 years	M depending on incorporation rate and package used	H	L-M	L	M-H	Simple plant required
HIP (Hot Isostatic Pressing)	Ceramic	H	L-M	Circa 10 years	H	L	L	M	L-M	Good ability to incorporate impurities
Vitrification	Glass	H	L-M	>10 years	H	M	L	H	L-M	
Immobilisation with the addition of very high level waste	Glass	H	L-M	>>10 years	VH	M	L	VH	L-M	

Each of these immobilisation and disposal options will be considered in turn.

A4.2.1 Low Specification MOx

Low specification MOx is essentially MOx pellets, (i.e sintered uranium/plutonium), which are not ground to strict QA sizes, stored in cans. The plutonium is diluted in this form and results in an increase in volume.

The main advantage of this waste form is that MOx production technology is relatively well established. As complex pin and fuel assembly is unlikely to be required, and grinding pellets to size is unlikely to be needed, the manufacture of a low spec MOx plant is likely to be much simpler and therefore less expensive than a "standard MOx fuel" plant.

There is a need to determine if low specification MOx has comparable repository behaviour to alternative waste forms. Recent research work has been sponsored to establish leaching characteristics of unirradiated MOx.

It could be considered that the existing Sellafield MOx plant might, after foreign plutonium fuel campaigns, be converted to a low specification MOx plant for UK plutonium. Given the throughput problems associated with the plant, it seems unlikely that the SMP could be converted, and its required workload executed, before it has reached the end of its design life. Therefore it seems most likely that a new MOx "waste" plant would need to be designed, built, commissioned and operated if this option was selected for further development.

A source of debate on low specification MOx is the proliferation resistance of the waste form. Some consider the immobile and diluted nature of the plutonium to be a considerable improvement over plutonium powder. However, the addition of the uranium to the plutonium to

make MOx means that it is slightly easier to handle as it has a lower neutron dose rate per package and lower temperature, and therefore some consider it may be easier to divert. Nonetheless, dissolution of MOx fuel is not easy and in order for any of the plutonium to be recovered in a form that was usable it would first have to be dissolved.

If MOx pellets could be stored in a can, it is likely that there would be around a threefold increase in the number of storage cans required compared to the plutonium in its current form. It is likely that this would require a security Category 1 store and the additional cost (>£500M) and size of the store would be an important consideration.

A4.2.2 Cement

Cement encapsulation of plutonium was ruled out as an option during the BNFL Plutonium Stakeholder Dialogue held around five years ago. However, the technical reasons were not clear and it has been decided to reconsider this option. Cementation is a well understood technology and a cementation plant is likely to be significantly cheaper than any of the alternative plants.

There has already been an assessment of behaviour of a cemented plutonium product. It has been established that radiolysis of the water physically associated with the powder occurs in the waste form and that subsequent gas production leads to product break-up. This is based on empirical work backed up by calculations. It has been estimated that cement could accommodate ~1 wt % plutonium loading without significant break up. However, the cemented product has inferior loading and durability compared to other options.

A maximum product plutonium loading on stability grounds would therefore be 1%, but it should be stressed that current repository safety cases allow much less (<<0.1%) plutonium loading as the cement is not considered to be a durable waste form under likely UK repository conditions. Although the number of waste packages at these incorporation rates is likely to be extremely large from this process, it is unlikely that a category 1 store will be required for the product and hence overall lifecycle costs could be competitive with other options.


In addition, some of the issues with respect to proliferation resistance mentioned above with the Low Spec MOx apply equally to a cement waste form. The likely incorporation rates would be low, requiring a large volume of waste to be stolen to recover any significant quantity of material. It is possible that proliferation resistance of waste in this form could be achieved by making the packages so big that they could not be readily removed.

It is important to note that such a technique may be considered to be a "dilute and disperse" route of plutonium immobilisation and disposal. One way of overcoming this may be to use the cement/plutonium form to encapsulate other wastes, for example miscellaneous Beta/Gamma waste.

A4.2.3 Hot Isostatic Pressing

Hot Isostatic Pressing (HIP) is a technique that is used widely around the world to produce high quality ceramics. It is a technology that is relatively new to nuclear waste applications. It works by the simultaneous application of pressure and temperature to a waste to produce a superior quality waste form (e.g. low porosity).

The technique is already being developed at Sellafield for the immobilisation of plutonium containing residues, where it has been established that operating temperatures are limited to around 1350 °C. The waste form is likely to produce 20kg ceramic blocks, which are suitable for storage in the new store at Sellafield and exhibit good packing characteristics.



The technology has been developed in collaboration with the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), and the use of Hot Isostatic Pressing to produce glass ceramic and ceramic waste forms is currently being demonstrated inactively (i.e. without uranium or plutonium) in the UK by mixing simulated plutonium feedstock with ceramic powders and subjecting them to temperature and pressure. The resulting waste form is shown below left, in the form that can be packaged in a Magnox plutonium can. The empty can prior to processing is shown on the right.

An extensive study into potential types of suitable ceramic hosts for the plutonium (using chemical surrogates) has been conducted, with funding from the NDA. The two most promising waste forms are now considered to be titanate-based and zirconate-based ceramics.

However, this technology is at a comparatively low stage of technology maturity, as HIP processing of plutonium containing waste forms has yet to be carried out above the ten gram plutonium scale abroad, and has only been researched in the UK using surrogate plutonium materials such as cerium and uranium. Nevertheless, this process is showing considerable promise. Estimates on potential numbers of waste packages are uncertain due to the immaturity of this process and the unknown package criticality restrictions.

A4.2.4 Vitrification

The current vitrification (i.e. glass making) process at Sellafield for immobilising High Level Waste would be unsuitable for plutonium vitrification as the operating conditions, scale of operation and likely glass compositions are all different. The preferred technology option is based on a process currently being developed at Savannah River in the USA, as part of the US plutonium disposition project. However, it is known that the US Department of Energy is reviewing this process and its future status is at present unclear.

The proposed process, in essence, uses a 10-15cm diameter cylindrical platinum-lined induction melter into which glass powder and plutonium is fed at 1300–1500 °C. The resulting glass would be drain-poured into stainless steel cans which would be approximately 15cm in diameter and 30 cm tall. It would be anticipated that plutonium loadings of around 10 wt% could be achieved using appropriate glass compositions.

NDA has recently funded research into suitable glass compositions for plutonium vitrification.

A4.2.5 Immobilisation with HLW

It has been proposed in the USA that plutonium should be immobilised with high level waste, either homogeneously or heterogeneously. A homogeneous waste would incorporate the plutonium within the high level vitrified product directly, whereas a heterogeneous waste would pour high level vitrified product around the outside of a plutonium waste product. There are enormous engineering demands required to couple a plutonium active facility making an immobilised plutonium product with a high level waste vitrification plant. Such a plant is likely to be extremely expensive.

To achieve this method of plutonium disposition in the UK would require retaining high level waste liquors at Sellafield for the length of the plutonium immobilisation programme, which would be around 20 years once the new plant had been built and commissioned. In practice this would mean delaying the vitrification of some of the High Level Liquid Waste currently stored at Sellafield. Given that this is the highest hazard material at Sellafield, and that this strategy would delay completion of hazard reduction of the High Active Liquid Waste until all the plutonium had been immobilised, in 40-50 years, the NDA is minded to dismiss this as a credible option. However, some commentators believe this option offers potentially very high proliferation resistance. In reality, the activity of the high level waste glass drops off sharply after 200-300 years and the waste form will offer no higher proliferation resistance than any of the above candidate wastes.

Technically this option may be deliverable; however, it is likely to be very expensive and would involve slowing down the hazard reduction at Sellafield. We believe that the advantages in terms of increased proliferation resistance are outweighed by the disadvantages in slower hazard reduction at Sellafield. Do you think that this is a valid assumption?

A4.3 Reuse and Dispose

“Re-use” in this context means only to convert the plutonium into a fuel and use it in a reactor. Plutonium fuels are an alternative to uranium fuels and the plutonium is used in an oxide form. The three main life stages of reuse are fuel manufacture, irradiating in a reactor, and spent fuel storage and disposal. These are discussed below in more detail.

The reuse strategy has not been developed in detail as it is very dependent on interest from reactor suppliers and future operators in utilising UK material. If the reuse option is found to have merit as a result of the initial analysis that is currently taking place, then the next stage of development would be to engage the market to establish whether there is any appetite for undertaking this work.

Type	Waste Form	Durability Of waste form	Proven Technology	Lead time	Proliferation Resistance	Environmental impact	Volume of waste	Waste form Cost	Disposal Cost	Additional Benefit
Reuse as fuel	Spent Fuel	H	H	1 – 20 years depending on plant suitability	VH assuming disposal as spent fuel	VL assuming low carbon energy generation	L	L-H depending on plant chosen	L	Potential economic benefit
Sell	N/A Sell as powder for conversion to ceramic fuel	N/A	N/A	Could begin very quickly, circa 5 years to develop new transport assets	VH assuming disposal as spent fuel in compliance with safeguards	VL assuming existing plant and low Carbon energy released	L	L	N/A	Potential economic benefit

A4.3.1 Fuel Manufacture

Reuse of separated plutonium and recycling into fuel has the potential to save the equivalent of 120 te of natural uranium per tonne of plutonium. In Europe, MOx Fuel is used routinely with about 30 reactors in France, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany currently using MOx as part of their fuel core.

For use in a reactor, plutonium dioxide needs to be turned into fuel pellets. Plutonium dioxide is mixed with another material (“carrier”) to produce a fuel. When the carrier is uranium dioxide, the fuel is known as MOx. This is the most widely used and proven plutonium fuel. A non-uranium carrier has been suggested producing what is called Inert Matrix Fuel (IMF), but this has unproven performance. Given that this technology is unproven, has little advantage over the technology that is proven, and would take longer to implement, the NDA is minded to reject this option.

IMF is an unproven technology, requiring significant further development and as such carries a higher risk than other fuel options. We believe that this means that IMF is not a credible option at this time. Do you agree that it is sensible to exclude the IMF option from the credible options that we present to Government?

The plutonium provides the majority of the fissile material and energy output from the fuel. The isotopic composition of the plutonium (see Appendix 1) therefore becomes important in determining how much plutonium must be incorporated to provide a similar reactivity of the fuel to that of standard enriched uranium dioxide fuel.

The plutonium becomes less useful with time due to the build up of Am-241 from the radioactive decay of Pu-241. This Am-241 can be managed in three main ways, namely blending, polishing and shortening plutonium storage times.

- Blending

- This is likely to involve new facilities for a UK-based solution, therefore adding cost to the process.
- Chemically “polish” i.e. remove impurities and Am-241 using, for instance, a dissolution and solvent extraction process
 - This would likely require a new facility in the UK.
 - This would add costs to the manufacture of MOx fuel.
 - The polishing process is likely to produce additional wastes.
- Manufacture early
 - This involves producing MOx fuel in the UK to much tighter timescales than currently anticipated. This would require early commitment, expedited planning, regulatory and political consent and early agreement with utilities to buy the fuel.

The manufacturing route for MOx fuel is different to standard enriched uranium dioxide fuel, and can be summarised in the table below:

UO ₂ Fuel	MOx Fuel
Purchase U ore	N/A
Convert to UF ₆ gas	N/A
Enrich UF ₆	N/A
Produce powder	Blend powders
Produce pellets from powder	Produce pellets from powder
Produce rods & assemblies	Produce rods & assemblies

There are two main manufacturing routes used for MOx fuel which vary in the way the powder is blended, the remainder of the process is essentially the same:

- The UK’s Short Binderless Route (SBR), used in the Sellafield MOx Plant
- Belgian/French Micronised MASTer blend (MIMAS) process used in the MELOX plant in France, being constructed in the US and likely to be adopted in Japan.

The SBR process mixes plutonium dioxide and uranium dioxide directly in the ratio required in a high energy attritor mill, which should be a fast and simple process. This produces a very homogeneous powder. The MIMAS process uses 30% plutonium dioxide powder in uranium dioxide powder “master blend”, which is extensively milled for around five hours and then diluted with more uranium dioxide to produce required plutonium content. This potentially results in some plutonium “hot spots” in the fuel. However, MOx fuels from both SBR and MIMAS have performed well in reactors.

The MIMAS process in the French Melox plant has been performing consistently well and now has a declared plant capacity of 195 tonnes of MOx fuel per year. The plant has produced over 1300 te of fuel without problems and MOx fuel is used routinely in many European reactors. However, Sellafield MOx plant has consistently underperformed and current throughput rates are down at only a few tonnes of MOx fuel per year. The eventual throughput that the Sellafield MOx Plant will reach is still uncertain.

As discussed in A4.2.1, it is highly unlikely that the Sellafield MOx plant as currently configured could perform any significant role in the production of MOx fuel from UK-owned plutonium. Therefore, MOx fuel manufacture would need to be carried out in either a new MOx plant in the UK or the plutonium would need to be exported abroad to a MOx plant with sufficient lifetime capacity


to make around 1400 tonnes of MOx fuel, assuming all the stockpile were to be recycled. The transport requirements of this export option, without a step change in feasibility, essentially rule out MOx manufacture outside the UK. Given the likely consultation, planning enquiry, design, build and commissioning timeframe, it is likely that a new UK MOx plant would be available for operations in a minimum of around 15 years. A fast-track consultation and planning enquiry could shorten that timeframe to around 10 years.

A4.3.2 Fuel Performance in a Reactor

MOx fuels have an impact on fuel and reactor performance and safety. Incorporation of MOx fuel into a reactor requires changes to the reactor (physical or procedural), the safety case and the licensing case.

Plutonium isotopes preferentially absorb more neutrons than uranium fuels. This means that any reactor control systems that rely on neutron absorption are affected. MOx fuel has lower thermal conductivity than uranium fuels and tends to run "hotter". Fission gas release and the fuel rod internal pressure can limit the burn-up of the MOx fuel.

A MOx assembly destroys about 30% of the Pu originally loaded into the fuel assembly. A uranium fuel assembly generates plutonium. This is illustrated in the graph below:



A balance in a reactor can be achieved at around 1/3 MOx & 2/3 uranium in the reactor i.e. there is a zero net gain of plutonium. Higher MOx fractions are possible: 40%+ has been demonstrated in Europe. Some of the new reactors claim to be able to burn 100% MOx cores, but this has yet to be demonstrated.

A4.3.3 Sell

A number of overseas companies and countries are pursuing MOx fuel based reactors and it is possible that there may be a market to sell (or transfer title for a nominal consideration) this material for use by others in making new fuel for their own reactors with an endpoint of direct disposal of the spent MOx fuel overseas.

In many ways this can be considered an attractive option, as there may be potential to transfer the disposal liability to a 3rd party and remove it from the NDA's financial responsibility. It is likely to be the cheapest of any of the options.

However, there are a number of issues with this option that would need to be addressed should it be enacted:


- Assuming the sale required transport of material overseas, new transport assets are likely to be required, both in terms of new packages being designed and licensed and new land- and sea-based means of transport to replace those currently available.
- Movement of the whole inventory, using existing means, would require the movement of several hundred shipments of plutonium, which is unlikely to be favoured politically. There may be other variants of this option worthy of consideration e.g. alternative transport regimes or where some preliminary treatment could be executed in the UK, prior to shipping, to convert the plutonium powder to a more easily transportable MOx form.
- It needs to be established that there is a real market for this material and that the energy value which is stored in the plutonium is something that a fuel manufacturer or utility is prepared to pay for.

The 'Sell' option could only be considered in compliance with international safeguards and international treaty requirements.

Do you believe that selling plutonium to allow fuel manufacture, in compliance with all the requisite security and international treaty requirements, should be considered as a credible option?


A4.3.4 Spent Fuel Storage and Disposal

The higher final plutonium and minor actinide content of spent MOx fuel results in higher heat load after discharge from the reactor. This has an impact on storage of spent MOx fuel – it requires longer interim storage before transport and final disposal. This is illustrated in the graph below.



A.5 Summary

The following table summarizes the options and NDA's initial view on the comparison of the options comparing some of the key criteria which are discussed in this paper. This will be updated once the work which is underway is completed - for example we have asked various industrial suppliers for their views on things like technical maturity.



Is there anything else you would like to tell us or comment on in relation to the options in this paper, for example are there any of the initial traffic lights that you think seem to be categorised wrongly?

A.6 Reference Material

Further background information can be found through the following links:

BNFL Stakeholder Dialogue Plutonium Working Group: (click on Published report 8)
<http://www.the-environment-council.org.uk/bnfl-national-stakeholder-dialogue.html>

NDA Macro-Economic Study:
<http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/upload/Uranium-and-Plutonium-Macro-Economic-Study-June-2007.pdf>

Royal Society Report on Plutonium:
<http://royalsociety.org/displaypagedoc.asp?id=18551>

Latest Published Site Summary Plans for Dounreay and Sellafield:
http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/upload/Sellafield_Site_Summary_2006_07_Life_Time_Plan.pdf

<http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&pageid=3962>

Appendix 1 – What is Plutonium?

Plutonium is element number 94 in the periodic table and has the chemical symbol Pu. It is a metal and belongs to the Actinide series of elements. The half-lives of the different isotopes differ markedly ranging from 14 years to around 375,000 years and this affects the characteristics of plutonium which is derived from different reactors.

It has 15 known isotopes, some of which are detailed in the table below:

Isotope	Isotopic Symbol	Half Life
Plutonium 238	Pu-238	87.7 years
Plutonium 239	Pu-239	24,114 years
Plutonium 240	Pu-240	6,563 years
Plutonium 241	Pu-241	14.4 years
Plutonium 242	Pu-242	373,509 years

The main isotope, Pu-239 is produced by neutron capture in U-238. If Pu-239 is left in the reactor further neutron capture yields higher isotopes viz. Pu-240, Pu-241 and Pu-242. Additionally Pu-239, once formed, still acts as a fuel in the reactor. In thermal reactors, the odd numbered isotopes of plutonium are fissile and produce more power, and the even numbered isotopes do not undergo fission and simply capture a neutron. Neutron capture and the higher fissionability of odd isotopes leads to accumulation of even isotopes as fuel is irradiated for longer periods. Plutonium isotopic mixture in spent fuel is therefore a function of the enrichment of the initial uranium fuel, the time the fuel is left in the reactor, the reactor type and the reactor operating conditions. Therefore, the “grade” of plutonium will depend on how it was produced.

The following table gives typical values of the isotopic composition of plutonium from different production routes:

Reactor Type	Mean fuel burn-up (MW d/t)	Percentage of Pu Isotopes at Discharge					Fissile Content %
		Pu-238	Pu-239	Pu-240	Pu-241	Pu-242	
Magnox	3000	0.1	80	16.9	2.7	0.3	82.7
	5000	N/A	68.5	25.0	5.3	1.2	73.8
CANDU	7500	N/A	66.6	26.6	5.3	1.5	71.9
AGR	18000	0.6	53.7	30.8	9.9	5.0	63.6
BWR	27500	2.6	59.8	23.7	10.6	3.3	70.4
	30400	N/A	56.8	23.8	14.3	5.1	71.1
PWR	33000	1.3	56.6	23.2	13.9	4.7	70.5
	43000	2.0	52.5	24.1	14.7	6.2	67.2
	53000	2.7	50.4	24.1	15.2	7.1	65.6

Table 1: Examples of the types of variation in plutonium composition produced from different sources

One of the issues associated with the higher burn up reactors such as Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors (AGRs) and Light Water Reactors (LWRs), is the formation of a non-fissile isotope of americium, Am-241 from the plutonium. The radioactive decay of Pu-241 forms Am-241 and its formation therefore reduces the fissile content of the plutonium. Additionally, as a strong SMS Plutonium Topic Strategy

gamma-radiation emitter, its formation increases the potential dose received from the plutonium. However, since the half-life of Pu-241 is only 14.4 years, virtually all the Pu-241 will have decayed to Am-241 after only 60 years. Chemical reprocessing removes any in-grown americium from the separated plutonium. Therefore in-growth begins on the day the fuel is reprocessed, not the day fuel was discharged from the reactor.

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